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Since January 1
st, 1997, the wholesale electricity market in the U.S. has been open to
competition through FERC Order 888. In order to satisfy the reciprocity requirements
which were imposed by FERC to foreign utilities, Hydro-Québec made  her transmission
grid accessible to third parties. A single flat rate is applied to account for transmission
losses; location and time of use play no role.
Hydro-Québec is a hydro based utility and it has very long linear high voltage power
lines which link hydro power sites in the north to consumption centres in the south. In
this paper, we compare three different methods of incorporating transmission losses into
nodal prices for a simplified model of Hydro-Québec electric network: flat rate, linear
power loss rates, and quadratic power loss rates. The latter two vary by node and time
of use. We estimate that nodal price differences between the flat rate and the quadratic
power loss rates can be as large as 27.8% on the producer side and 32.7% on the
consumer side. The implications of such price differences for the location of economic
activity over the service area could be significant.2
Introduction
The on-going restructuration of the electric power industry which is taking place in
several countries around the world has brought to the fore topics which had received
scant attention in public utilities economics thus far, that is, the governance structure
and the pricing of electric power transmission services. Up to the early nineties,
electricity was provided by firms which were vertically integrated monopolies and a
single organisation, which was subject to government control or regulation, was
responsible for generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity over the assigned
service area. It is now possible to generate electricity by small natural gas turbines
without incurring significant unit cost increases and this possibility has changed the view
on the role played by economies of scale at the generation stage, while transmission
and distribution kept their natural monopoly features.
1 Technological changes and the
public pressure to lower electricity prices undermined the conventional structure of the
electric power industry. This led to the privatization of the whole industry in England in
1990 as well as the introduction of competition in electricity generation.
2 Since then, the
British model has been adopted with some modifications by several countries.
The opening of electricity generation to competitive market forces first brought the
deregulation of the wholesale market, that is, the market between producers on the one
hand and local distribution utilities on the other hand. In some cases, this has been
followed by partial or even total retail market deregulation. Whatever type of
deregulation is being considered, non-discriminatory access to transmission networks
must be implemented to reap the benefits of competition. Furthermore prices must be
set for transmission services.3
Following the path-breaking works of Schweppe et al. (1988) and Hogan (1992),
economists have developed optimal transmission pricing rules when the objective is the
maximization of social economic surplus subject to production and transmission capacity
constraints while taking into account line losses, loop flows, and reliability criteria. The
first order conditions associated with the maximization of economic benefits under
constraints yield the electricity prices paid by users and received by producers at each
node.
3 These prices vary from node to node due mostly to transmission line congestion
and losses. The value of a transmission right between two nodes is equal to the price
differential between these nodes. For a recent survey of the transmission pricing
literature, see Hsu (1997).
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The emphasis thus far has been on web like transmission networks which link together
load centres and thermal generating stations and which give rise to loop flows. For such
networks, there is some discretion in the decision to locate new thermal power plants
and important factors in this respect are the load distribution over space, available coal
or natural gas supplies, high voltage power line corridors, and environmental concerns.
Hydro power stations do not allow for this kind of flexibility and their location is
determined by water flows and geography. They may be located at sites which are far
away from consumption centres and they require long linear high voltage transmission
lines to bridge a link between production and consumption. Hydroelectricity is produced
by the energy of falling water. The water, which is stored behind the dams, usually
comes from spring runoffs. This is the water which is available to meet demand until the
start of the next annual cycle. Import and export from/to interconnected adjacent areas
play a critical role in balancing supply and demand over the course of the year.
Exchanges take place with neighbours which do not display the same demand patterns.4
Imports increase during the peak period and the flows of electricity are reversed in the
off-peak period.
Important features of hydro-based electric systems are the water use over the course of
the year and the losses over the long linear high voltage power lines. The limits of
transmission line capacity are not so significant as in thermal systems since generation
and transmission capacities are developed to fit together.
5
In this paper, we analyse and compare three methods of pricing transmission losses for
a hydroelectric power system while taking into account generation and consumption at
each node, power exchanges with neighbouring areas, and the available stock of water
over the annual cycle. The simple model is applied to Hydro-Québec, a hydro-based
utility, which had a total generating capacity of 36841 MW (94.0% hydro) at the end of
1996.
6 The three methods of pricing transmission losses are: single flat rate, which is
common to all nodes during the peak and the off-peak period, rates based on linear
power losses, and rates based on quadratic power losses. The latter two rates vary by
node and time of use.
The development proceeds as follows: section one presents some background
information and the topic which is analysed in this paper. In section two, we recall some
theoretical considerations on power flows, transmission pricing, and the value of water
used to generate electricity. In section three, we present and discuss the results. We
show that the three methods of pricing transmission losses lead to different prices at
each node; for instance, the price differentials between the single flat rate and the rates
based on quadratic transmission losses can be as large as 27.8% from the producer
standpoint and 32.7% from the consumer standpoint.5
Section 1: Context and the topic to be analyzed
1.1 Hydro-Québec: an overview
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Since the application in this paper deals with Hydro-Québec, it is appropriate at this
stage to know more about this electric utility. Hydro-Québec is a government-owned
utility which provides electricity to most users in the province of Québec.
8 In 1996,
9 the
vertically integrated utility sold 144.5 TWh to local customers and 19.0 TWh to utilities
located outside the province. Total generation, transmission, and distribution losses
were 12.3 TWh. Peak demand reached 31245 MW in winter, due to electric heating,
and summer months are part of the off-peak period. The available capacity was
36841 MW at year end and the hydro share (34648 MW) was 94.0%.
10 One nuclear
plant (675  MW) and a set of fuel oil power plants of various sizes account for the
remaining capacity (1518 MW).
The Hydro-Québec network is interconnected with all the adjacent regions: Ontario
(1462 MW),  New Brunswick  (1050 MW),  New  York  (2675 MW),  and  New England
(2300 MW) for a total of 7487 MW. Because some equipment is used jointly by New
York and Ontario, the simultaneous capacity is limited to 6337 MW.
11 Peak demands in
New York and New England occur over the summer months. If we set aside the
purchase of electricity from Labrador, Newfoundland, through a long term contract
(65  years), Hydro-Québec buys little electricity from producers located outside the
province and the interconnections are used mostly to export power through long term
contracts (9.6  TWh) and through short term ones (9.4  TWh). On average, Hydro-
Québec has been selling more than 10% of her production to utilities located outside the
province.6
As it can be seen from Figure 1, very large hydro power sites which are located more
than 1000 km in the northern part of the province provide the bulk of the hydro capacity:
James Bay on the western side with 14  790  MW and Churchill Falls–Manicouagan-
Outardes on the eastern side, with 12 060 MW. Other significant albeit smaller hydro
power plants are located in the Trois-Rivières district and on the St. Lawrence River up
from Montréal. The bulk of the consumption, as well as exports, takes place in the
southern part of the province and 735 kV high voltage power lines, which link production
in the north to consumption centres in the south, form the backbone of Hydro-Québec
transmission network. There are 11 000 kilometres of such high voltage power lines.
Once power reaches the consumption centres, it is transmitted and distributed at lower
voltage.
1.2 Transmission pricing
The wholesale electricity market in the U.S. has been open to competition since
January 1
st,  1997, through FERC Order  888. Following this order, producers, local
distribution utilities or any FERC licenced marketers can exchange electricity at market
prices. This implies that transmission lines must be open to all interested parties in a
non-discriminatory fashion at agreed price schemes.
The pricing of transmission services is giving rise to a large set of complex issues which
are related to the nature of the services themselves and which have to be addressed by
regulatory commissions. Electricity cannot be stored and it has to be delivered with a
high level of reliability when it is requested by customers. A transmission network
provides a delicate balancing mechanism between production at some large power
stations and load centres which are scattered over wide areas. Important issues are7
reliability, stability, congestion, and reserve maintenance. Furthermore, transmission
rates must provide an acceptable return to grid owners. Transmission rates must also
be set to foster the efficient use of available generating equipments and to provide
appropriate signals for transmission development.
FERC did not dictate specific pricing schemes with respect to transmission services, but
rather it relied upon proposals from interested parties as long as the pricing schemes
embodied the general principles of open access to third parties at non-discriminatory
rates. Thus far three broad methods have been applied to determine transmission rates:
flat rate or average cost pricing, zonal rates which are simply flat rates albeit over
smaller areas, and finally nodal prices, which reflect the marginal costs of producing
electricity at various nodes over a network. It should be pointed out that transmission
line losses have received little attention from regulatory agencies thus far.
Hydro-Québec applied to FERC for a licence to operate as a wholesale marketer in the
U.S. market and her application got approved in late 1997.
12 FERC imposed some
reciprocity conditions upon foreign applicants which require the latter to open their
transmission networks along the lines adopted for the U.S. wholesale market. To satisfy
these conditions, Hydro-Québec created a new division, TransÉnergie, which manages
all her transmission assets, and the Québec government set the conditions and the
rates for the open access to the transmission network.
13 The government chose a single
flat rate which is uniform over the whole province for all the time periods. The same
approach applies to line losses. In order to have 1kWh delivered by TransÉnergie, the
supplier must provide 1.07 kWh for point to point sale whatever are the point in, the
point out, and the time period, and 1.05 kWh for grid sale.8
1.3 The analysis
In this paper, we focus on three methods to set nodal prices in order to take into
account line losses: a flat rate for the whole network as it is currently applied by
TransÉnergie, rates based on linear power losses, and finally rates based on quadratic
power losses. Only two time periods are considered: peak and off-peak. Furthermore,
we incorporate one important feature of the hydroelectric system under consideration
which is the balancing mechanism associated with electricity import and export.
However, our analysis does not rely on an integrated optimizing model and therefore we
do not compute the optimal power flows between nodes in order to maximize either
social economic surplus or the value of the available stock of water. Rather we take as
given total hydro power generation and electricity use at different nodes as they
occurred in 1996 and the constant transmission loss (%) as it is specified under current
regulation and we analyse how nodal prices vary when they are adjusted to embody the
three ways of incorporating transmission losses. The main purpose of the analysis is to
shed some light on the limitations associated with the current flat rate for transmission
losses.
Since we focus mainly on transmission losses, we neglect some other elements which
have attracted the attention thus far in the economic literature on transmission pricing,
namely, congestion and loop flows. These two elements of transmission are not so
important for hydro-based electric networks when hydro power sites are located far from
consumption centres.
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Section 2: Some theoretical considerations
Although the theoretical literature on optimal nodal pricing of transmission services is
now well developed, a small number of applications which embody these principles have
been implemented so far.
15 Furthermore very few studies have dealt with the
implications of different transmission pricing methods. One exception is Green (1998),
who applies the optimizing approach to the England and Wales electric system while
taking into account transmission capacity constraints and line losses under four pricing
regimes of transmission services: nodal pricing which is taken as the first best case, one
uniform price for consumers and nodal prices for producers, nodal prices for consumers
and one uniform price for producers, and finally, uniform prices for both consumers and
producers. Congestion and transmission line losses are the major factors which lead to
price differences between the northern area which is a net supplier and the southern
area where the bulk of the load occurs. Let us recall briefly some theoretical
considerations which are germane to our analysis.
2.1 Power flows
The basis for the calculation of power flows is the direct current (DC) model.
16 This
model is based on two assumptions. First, only active power flows are considered.
Second, line losses are computed separately from the computation of transmitted
power. DC power flows are computed from net generation:
P = H (Y-d)10
where: Y = the vector of generation at each node;
d = the vector of demand at each node;
H = the transfer matrix;
P = the vector of power flows between nodes.
The transfer matrix need not be defined explicitly in the case of a linear transmission
network as the one studied here. This simple model will be described in section 3.1.
Actually the elements of the H matrix can readily be interpreted by inspection of the
model as it is done in the next section.
2.2 Nodal pricing
We do not apply an optimizing routine, rather we take consumption and production in
each region as given and we compute the nodal prices under the three methods of
incorporating transmission losses. Our starting point is the nodal pricing rule as
presented in Hsu (1997) when it is simplified by removing generation and transmission
capacity constraints:
17
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Using the same assumptions as before, equation (1) can be rewritten in the following
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where: [] ) t ( P L i i  = line losses over line i at time t;
Pi(t) = power transmitted over line i at time t (MW);
) t ( Hik = line indicator from the swing node to node k at time t. It
takes value +1 or –1 according to the direction of power
flows, or 0 if line i does not link the swing node to node k.
The three methods of incorporating explicitly transmission line losses into nodal  prices
at each time period are:
iii.  One flat rate:
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  where:  c(t) = loss factor at time t (%).
iv.  Rate based on linear power losses:
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where: f(t) = line loss per km at time t (MW/km);12
i D  = length of line i (km).
This way of incorporating line losses is based on the fictious assumption of linear line
losses:
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iii.  Rate based on quadratic power losses:
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where:  R(t) = line resistance per km at time t (Ohms/km);
V = voltage (kV).
This last way of incorporating line losses is based on the quadratic equation determining
the power loss through heat:
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i  quadratic line losses over line i at time t.
We can see the effect of the marginal loss on the nodal price in equation (6). The line
resistance is made to vary with time because we have different loss factors for the peak
and the off-peak period.13
2.3 Value of water
The node which has the highest marginal cost is taken to be the swing node. For a
thermal system, it is fairly easy to rank the power stations in terms of their marginal
operating costs. Hydro power stations are different in this respect and their operating
cost is almost nil; however the electricity which can be generated is constrained by the
available water which is stored in the reservoirs. The relevant factor is the opportunity
cost of water. Since import provides the marginal supply during the peak period, import
is taken to be the swing node at that period. This also determines the opportunity cost of
water since the producer should be indifferent between importing electricity and
generating it by his own hydro power station. For the off-peak period, the opportunity
cost of water is the same as in the peak period if the producer is maximizing the value of
the available water. The James Bay node which corresponds to the last large hydro
power site which has been developed in the province of Québec is taken to be the swing
node in the off-peak period in the empirical analysis which follows.
Section 3: The simplified network and the empirical
results
In this section, we present the results which are obtained when we apply the three nodal
pricing formulas, as they were introduced in the previous section, to a simplified model
of the 735 kV transmission network of Hydro-Québec for 1996. Several assumptions
have to be made in order to go from a highly complex hydro power network as it is
shown in Figure 1 to a simplified model which can be analyzed without the help of a
large scale simulation model, while preserving the main characteristics of the network
which are: long linear high voltage power lines from the north (generation) to the south14
(consumption), the line losses under peak and off-peak use, the availability of water
over the annual cycle, and the interconnections with the adjacent areas in the southern
part of the province. Now we describe the main assumptions in this respect.
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3.1 A simplified network
i.  From administrative districts to nodes
Hydro-Québec high voltage transmission network is simplified in such a way that each
node corresponds to an administrative district (or a set of administrative districts) linked
by power lines. In this way, the model represents power exchanges between the
districts. Table 1 shows the relationships between Hydro-Québec administrative districts
in 1996 and the nodes in the simplified model and Figure 2 provides a graphical
representation of the nodes, the lines, their length,
19 and the direction of power flows.
20
ii.  The transmission network and power losses
We assume that there is no congestion over the whole network and that all the lines
have the same voltage which is 735 kV. As it can be seen from equation (3), the loss
factor, c(t), varies with time. During the peak period, losses are taken to be 7.0% of the
load. This is the loss factor for point to point delivery under the current transmission
rates in Québec. During the off-peak period, losses are taken to be 5.0% of the load.
This last figure is the loss factor for grid sale under the current regulation. The line loss
per km in the linear loss model, f(t), and the line resistance per km in the quadratic loss
model, R(t), vary with the time period, but not with the lines. Total losses are the same
under the three different ways of incorporating losses into nodal prices. The supplier
which is located at the swing node (the marginal producer) compensates for power
losses.15
iii. Demand
There are two time periods: peak which lasts 300 hours and off-peak which lasts
8460 hours. Demand is constant within each period. Off-peak demand is adjusted so
that Hydro-Québec annual sales match the sum of peak and off-peak demands. The
district (node) shares of consumption within each period are the same as the annual
shares. Table 2 shows the 1996 actual electricity sales by district
21 and Table 3 provides
the corresponding computed figures during the peak and the off-peak period. It can be
seen that the largest electricity sale occurs in the Montréal district (63.4%) followed by
the Québec district (24.9%).
iv.  Power generation, import/export, and transfer
Table 2 shows the installed generating capacity by district. The nuclear station (675
MW) is considered to be a must-run unit in both periods.
22 The thermal stations are
assumed to operate at maximum capacity during the peak period and to be shut down
during the off-peak period. The hydro power stations are assumed to have the same
load factor (55.4%) and the off-peak load factor is computed in such a way that the
weighted sum of the peak and off-peak load factors matches the annual load factor.
Import during the peak period is set at 500 MW before losses at price $40/MWh.
23
Export during the off-peak is a residual so that generation plus import equal sales within
the province plus export. Table 3 shows the peak and the off-peak production as well as
the net supply by node, and Table 4 displays the power transfer over the power lines.16
v.  System lambda or marginal production cost
The system lambda, which is the marginal production cost, is the import price
($40.00/MWh) during the peak period. This also determines the opportunity cost of
water at James Bay as it was presented in Section 2. So the opportunity cost of water at
James Bay in the peak period is equal to the import price once power losses to the
Montréal node are taken into account for the two nodes. This also determines the
system lambda in the off-peak period since James Bay is then the swing node.
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3.2 Empirical results
Total losses are the same under the three pricing methods and they are equal to the
losses as they are computed under the current regulatory regime. Table 5 provides the
peak and the off-peak spot prices at each node ($/MWh) when import is the swing node
in the peak period and James Bay is the swing node in the off-peak period.  We can see
the direct effects of power line losses related to length by looking at the peak nodal
prices of James Bay (long distance) ($35.57/MWh) and import (short distance)
($40.00/MWh) vis-à-vis Montréal ($40.26/MWh) under the linear power loss rates. We
can also observe the effects of quadratic power line losses in comparison to linear
power line losses by looking at the peak nodal prices of James Bay: $28.88/MWh for the
former and $35.57/MWh for the latter.
Table 6 shows the spot prices under linear and quadratic power losses relative to the
flat rate (producer price). It can be seen that the nodal spot price differentials can be
quite large. For a producer which is as far away as James Bay, the difference is 11.1%
under linear power losses and 27.8% under quadratic power losses. The relative17
differences with respect to the consumer price, i.e. 42.80 MWh, are larger. For instance,
it is 32.7% at the James Bay node under the quadratic power losses.
No profit is generated under the single flat rate when all sales (including losses) and all
purchases are realized at constant prices at each node.
25   The price spread (%) is
exactly equal to the loss (%). We do not have the zero profit result for the two other
pricing methods. The linear loss rates yields a loss of $ 268 000 per year when demand
and production, including the losses, receive the prices displayed in Table 5. The
quadratic power loss rates generate an annual profit of 253 million $. The latter amount
falls short of the total revenue requirements for TransÉnergie which were estimated by
Gouvernement du Québec (1997) to be 2260 million $. This implies that some other
ways to finance the capital invested in the transmission network need to be implemented
to go along with the nodal prices which are presented in Table 5.
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Conclusion
Bernard and Doucet (1999) argued that the average cost pricing of transmission
services can lead to misleading price signals for large hydro-based power networks
which have long linear high voltage transmission lines between hydro power sites and
consumption centres. However they failed to incorporate any information on the
empirical significance of this effect. Here we use a simplified model of Hydro-Québec
network to compute the nodal prices when line losses are the main factor leading to
nodal price differences. Losses are incorporated in nodal prices through three methods,
i.e. flat rate, linear power loss rates, and quadratic power loss rates. In this simple
model, linear power loss rates and quadratic power loss rates are estimated to display
significant differences relative to the single flat rate.  Although the model is quite simple,18
it has been specified to represent a good first order approximation of reality. Our
preferred representation of line losses appears in the quadratic line loss nodal prices.
These are the prices which should enter into the producer decision with respect to new
power site location. Our results indicate that the current flat rate provides erroneous
price signals. Line losses are real economic losses and they should be properly
reflected into prices paid to producers and prices paid by consumers.19
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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HYDRO-QUÉBEC ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICTS IN 1996
AND NODES IN THE SIMPLE MODEL
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SALES AND GENERATING CAPACITY
Node Electricity sales Generating capacity
a (MW)







1 Churchill Falls 0 0.0 5428 0 5428 14.8
2 Manic 10690 7.8 8599 0 8599 23.5
3 Québec 34386 24.9 0 0 0 0.0
4 Trois-Rivières 0 0.0 1636 1103 3339 9.1
5 Montréal 87403 63.4 3252 801 3453 9.4
6 James Bay 5353 3.9 15 698 162 15 860 43.2
7 Export/Import
b - - -- --
Total 137 832 100.0 34613 2066 36679 100.0
a) December 31, 1996.
b) Electricity imports and exports are described in the text.
Source: Hydro-Québec (1997b)23
Table 3
PEAK AND OFF-PEAK OF DEMAND AND PRODUCTION BY NODE (MW)
Node Peak Off-peak
Number Name Demand Production Net Demand Production Net
1 Churchill Falls 0 4177 4177 0 2820 2820
2 Manic 2278 6617 4339 1190 4467 3277
3 Québec 7271 0 -7271 3799 0 -3799
4 Trois-Rivières 0 2362 2362 0 1524 1524
5 Montréal 18513 3303 -15 210 9673 1689 -7984
6 James Bay 1139 12 242 11 103 595 8155 7560
7 Export/Import 0 500 500 3398 0 3398
Total 29 201 29 201 0 18 655 18 655 0
Power losses - 2044
a - - 933
b -
a) Compensated by import.
b) Compensated by James Bay.24
Table 4
POWER TRANSFER (MW)



















Number Name Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak
1 Churchill Falls 40.00 40.00 34.59 35.01 33.70 30.84
2 Manic 40.00 40.00 37.98 36.65 36.28 32.03
3 Québec 40.00 40.00 39.24 37.66 39.50 33.60
4 Trois-Rivières 40.00 40.00 39.76 37.94 39.64 33.77
5 Montréal 40.00 40.00 40.26 38.24 40.03 34.05
6 James Bay 40.00 40.00 35.57 35.57 28.88 28.88
7 Export/Import 40.00 40.00 40.00 38.38 40.00 34.18
a) This is the producer price. The consumer price is $42.80/MWh.26
Table 6






Number Name Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak
1 Churchill Falls 86.5 87.6 84.2 77.1
2 Manic 93.7 91.6 90.7 80.1
3 Québec 98.1 94.1 98.8 84.0
4 Trois-Rivières 99.4 94.8 99.4 84.4
5 Montréal    100.6 95.6 100.1 85.1
6 James Bay 88.9 88.9 72.2 72.2
7 Export/Import  100.00 95.9  100.00 85.427
Notes
1.  For an early investigation of the empirical evidence on the extent of economies
of scale in electricity generation, see Joskow and Schmalensee (1983).
2.  Although there were earlier experiments in some countries such as Chili, the
British policy change is considered to be the benchmark into the new era of
electricity market deregulation. See papers in Gilbert and Kahn (1996).
3.  A node is a consumption centre, a producer or set of producers, or a set of high
voltage power lines that meet at one point.
4.  See also papers in Journal of Regulatory Economics (1996) and Utilities Policy
(1997).
5.  The limits of the interconnections with adjacent regions may still be significant.
6.  More information on Hydro-Québec will be provided in section one.
7.  The information presented in this section comes from Hydro-Québec (1997a,b).
8.  Besides Hydro-Québec, there are nine municipal distribution services which
purchase electricity from the latter. Furthermore, private producers owned and
operated 3864 MW (96% hydro) mostly for their own use.
9.  The most recent year for which district consumption and production data are
available is 1996.
10. This includes the 5428  MW hydro power plant located at Churchill Falls in
Labrador, Newfoundland. Through a long term contract, Hydro-Québec gets
nearly all the output from this plant.
11. The effective export capacity is of the order of 5500 MW, while the effective
import capacity is of the order of 4500 MW.
12.  Up to that point Hydro-Québec was selling electricity at border points.
13.  Gouvernement du Québec (1997).
14. Besides Hydro-Québec, British Columbia Hydro and Manitoba Hydro are two
other Canadian utilities which have transmission networks linking hydro power
sites located far from consumption centres.
15.  Exceptions are the Pennsylvania – New Jersey – Maryland area in the U.
 S. and
New Zealand.
16. The DC label is related to the history of this industry. It refers to the time when
power flows were obtained from a miniature model of the actual transmission
network under investigation; this miniature model was using direct current (DC).28
17.  See equation (14) in Hsu (1997) and set  QS γ  and 
i QS µ  equal to zero.
18. The detailed information with respect to the computation of consumption and
production at each node appears in Guertin (2000).
19.  The approximative distances in km between substations have been provided by
TransÉnergie: line 
→
1 , Churchill-Manicouagan (619 km); line 
→
2 , Manicouagan-
Lévis (379 km); line
→
3 , Lévis-Nicolet (110 km); line 
→
4 , Lévis-Boucherville
(Montréal) (108 km); line
→
5 , LG2-Chénier (Montréal) (1006 km); line 
→
6 ,
Châteauguay (Montréal)-Massena (New-York) (56 km).
20.  The Matapedia district is left out because it includes the Gaspé Peninsula and a
set of small isolated networks which are scattered outside the region served by
the main network. It represents less than 0,5% of generation capacity and 4% of
annual sales.
21. There are no electricity sales in the Trois-Rivières district because they were
recorded in the Montréal and the Québec districts in 1996.
22.  Its load factor was 94.4% in 1996.
23.  All figures are in Canadian dollars.
24. In an optimizing model designed to maximize the value of water, the peak and
the off-peak opportunity costs of water would be the same at all hydro power
plants if each hydro power site has enough storage capacity. Furthermore, the
opportunity costs of water at all power sites would be equal once the power line
losses are taken into consideration. Here we do not have these results because
we try to approximate actual sales and generation by district and also because
our network is a gross simplification of the real network.
25.  In that sense, the flat rate does not lead to a pure nodal pricing system since we
do not have identical prices for power sold and purchased at a given node.
26.  Green (1998) arrives at the same conclusion.29
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